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Epigraphs
We say: ‘I didn’t see; my attention was elsewhere. I didn’t hear; my attention
was elsewhere.’ For it is through the attention that one sees and hears.
Therefore, even when someone touches us on the back, we perceive it through
the attention.
—Brḥada¯ran
˙
yaka Upanis
˙
ad (c. th century BCE. BU ..)
And what is the proximate cause for knowledge, for seeing things as they really
are? It should be said: attention.
—Sam
˙
yutta Nika¯ya (c. rd century BCE. S.ii.)
Attention is the centring of consciousness evenly and correctly on a single object;
placing is what is meant. Its function is to eliminate distractors.
—Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification (c.  CE; Path  [iii.])
The function of consciousness must be to link us attentively to the physical world
that contains us . . . Attention ultimately functions as a sort of life-blood for a
whole range of mental phenomena; or perhaps better expressed, as a kind of
psychic space . . . A system of experience constitutes a continuous ongoing
phenomenon which is a sort of circle or centre of awareness. This awareness is
the Attention.
—Brian O’Shaughnessy, Consciousness and the World
(: , , )
(Used with the kind permission of Oxford University Press)
Attention provides a window for consciousness through which we become aware
of a small subset of real bindings among a throng of illusory phantom objects.
—Anne Treisman, ‘Consciousness and Perceptual Binding’ in
A. Cleeremans and C. Frith eds., The Unity of Consciousness,
Binding, Integration, and Disassociation (: )
(Used with the kind permission of Oxford University Press)
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We should not pretend to find a detached self in all our experiencing and
acting . . . we should discard the idea that mindedness implies the presence of a
detached self.
—John McDowell, ‘The Myth of the Mind as Detached’ in Joseph
Schear ed., Mind, Reason and Being-in-the World (: )
(Used with the kind permission of Routledge Press)
There is no inner self which does the looking towards or looking away.
—Buddhaghosa, The Dispeller of Delusion (c.  CE; Dispeller )
When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in
contemplating a portrait, there is no I . . . I am then plunged into the world of
attractive and repellant qualities—but me, I have disappeared.
—Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (: , )
Attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies.
—William James, Principles of Psychology (, v. : )
Shame is my empathetic awareness of the other’s attention . . . leading to
decreased self-esteem.
—Dan Zahavi, Self and Other (: )
(Used with the kind permission of Oxford University Press)
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Introduction
This book is an exploration of the reorientations that take place when
attention is given priority in the analysis of mind. Attention, I will argue,
has an explanatory role in understanding the nature of mental action in
general and of speciﬁc mental actions such as intending, remembering,
introspecting, and empathizing. It has a central role in explaining the
structure of the phenomenal and of cognitive access, the concept of the
intentionality or directedness of the mental, the unity of consciousness, and
the epistemology of perception. And attention is also key to an account of
the nature of persons and their identity, to the distinction between oneself
and others, and to the moral psychology that rests upon it.
I claim that what explains the nature of our consciously active involve-
ment with the world, our freedom from passivity, is attention. This leads me
ﬁrst to reject two ideas in the philosophy of action, agent causalism and the
causal theory of action, one very much out of vogue and the other very
much in. What I will call the ‘Authorship View’ of self detaches the self from
experience and action; it is the main target of Buddhist ‘no-self ’ (anatta)
polemic, more so even than notions of self as permanent substance or
substratum. The argument is perhaps straightforward: being the centre of
an organized arena of experience and action is a property not of a real but at
best of a virtual entity, which as such cannot have any causal powers; so the
self cannot be an agent. It cannot be an inactive witness either, because
witnessing is meta-cognitive attention and attention is a mental action. The
causal theory of action, that an event is an action just in case it is caused by a
rationalizing intention which is itself the result of an agent’s motivating
beliefs and desires, may provide a sufﬁcient condition for action but cannot
constitute a necessary one—not, at least, if one wants to leave room for the
idea that much of what happens in the mind is mental action and not mere
happening. That is particularly true of attention, considered as a fundamental
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kind of mental action, and it is unfortunate that the inﬂuence of the causal
theory of action continues in cognitive psychology’s enduring attachment to
an endogenous/exogenous distinction in theories of attention.
Conscious attention, I will argue, performs two distinct roles in experi-
ence, a role of placing and a role of focusing, roles which match a distinction
between selection and access endorsed in inﬂuential recent theories of
attention (Treisman ; Huang and Pashler ). The intentionality of
conscious experience rests on two sorts of attentional action, a focusing-at and
a placing-on, the ﬁrst lending to experience a perspectival categorical content
and the second structuring its phenomenal character. Placing should be
thought of more like opening a window for consciousness than as shining
a spotlight, and focusing has to do with accessing the properties of whatever
the window opens onto. A window is an aperture whose boundaries are
deﬁned by what is excluded—in this case, distractors. The claim that
attention performs two constitutive roles in perceptual experience is motiv-
ated by a need to respect two apparently competing insights about experi-
ence, one having to do with its epistemic role in supplying reasons for our
beliefs about the world around us, the other to do with the phenomenology
of openness to the world. Attention is the glue that binds our sensate, active,
and rational natures, that in virtue of which we both ﬁnd ourselves absorbed
by a world of solicitations and also what enables us to access objective
features of the entities whose presence solicits us.
The recognition that attention performs these two roles enables me to
argue that the epistemology of attention is such that attention provides an
immediate improvement to justiﬁcation, as long as there are no defeaters,
and also that when suitably expert attention is sufﬁcient for knowledge.
I will argue that attentional justiﬁcation is an underived epistemic principle,
and relate it with a view known as ‘Dogmatism’ in the epistemology of
perception. There is, I will agree, cognitive penetration of attention by
beliefs and interests, as well as by past actions, but it is restricted in scope.
So attention improves justiﬁcation, and sometimes, when attention is trained
or cultivated, the improvement is such as to deliver knowledge.
A puzzle about attention with a long history will need to be addressed, the
puzzle that attention can be captured by events or features and in such cases
does not appear to be required for conscious experience. One might argue
that there is still conscious attention in these cases, though of a global sort;
but the view I defend is rather that attention has a subliminal as well as a
 INTRODUCTION
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conscious form. Subliminally, attention is the mode of activity of cognitive
modules which are responsible for the orienting towards and processing of
stimuli, and their deliverance into awareness, as well as for crossmodal
integration. A close relationship between attention and working memory
is revealed, attention having a large part to play in the gate-keeping,
maintaining, and modulating of information in working memory. Atten-
tional orienting is an action with two aspects, a cognitive aspect in the
instruction to select a sense modality, and a contribution to consciousness
through the embodied intentionality that is a matter of being ‘in touch
with’, alive or present to, engaged by, the environment. So orienting has a
constitutive role in a ﬁrst sort of reaching out which consists in being present
to the world. It will be important to separate the role of attention within a
philosophy of conscious thought from its role within a philosophy of cogni-
tive science, between attention considered as a contributor to conscious
experience and attention considered as an activation of cognitive modules.
It is a fundamental feature of the account to be developed here that there
are many varieties of conscious attention. A basic (that is to say, irreducible)
kind of attention is intending, when one sets oneself to act, a straining or
exertion that ﬁlls the ‘psychic space’ with resolution. Other basic kinds of
attention are introspection, a distinctive manner of attending to the world
and not quasi-perceptual awareness of one’s inner life, and mindful atten-
tion, a kind of rehearsing or retentive attention. Attention, moreover, is that
in virtue of which one does not merely live in the present but also travels
mentally into the past and is situated in a social world with others. So
another basic variety of attention is past-directed and autonoetic: it is placed
on past events whose properties are retrieved in an act of simulated reliving.
In episodic memory, the reliving of experience from one’s personal past,
one attends to the past in a particular way, but there is no reduction of
the phenomenology of temporal experience to a representation of self as
in the past.
Attention can also be placed on others, and this, too, is a basic variety of
attention. Now it is you on whom my attention is placed, and what I access
in focusing on you are your mental states. I do not experience them directly;
rather, your movements provide focal attention with a causal channel: they
‘intimate’ your thoughts to me. It is analogous to listening to another, itself a
kind of attention. So empathy, one’s awareness of another in their otherness,
is an attentional state, a fact that is phenomenologically evident if one reﬂects
INTRODUCTION 
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on what it is like oneself to be that other on whom another’s attention falls.
To conceive of a being as other is to conceive of it as the centre of an arena
of presence and action in which one may oneself be located, but not at the
centre. While phenomenologists have claimed that empathy is a perceptual
skill, I will argue instead that empathy is a distinct kind of attention,
attention through embodied comportment to the feelings, commitments,
and wishes of others as others.
I will draw on the distinction between self and other that is made available
by empathetic attention in order to construct an account of persons. Persons
are not merely causally connected chains of psycho-physical events, nor are
they physical objects that happen to instantiate mental properties: they are
loci of value and signiﬁcance. The boundaries of a person are deﬁned by
what is excluded as alien, and so the notion of a person is apophatic rather
than forensic. Emotions like shame evidently presuppose that there is such a
distinction, for shame is an empathetic access to another’s attention on one,
and a resultant diminishing of self-esteem.
There is no need to introduce any more robust distinction between self
and other than the one implied by a conception of persons as beings with a
characteristic capacity for attention. In particular, there is no need to con-
ceive of the distinction as having its basis in a phenomenology of interiority
or in an authorial conception of self. There is nothing that could be
described as the invariant core of a human being, such as a set of ﬁxed
character traits, but one effect of attending is to make some elements more
central, at least for a short period. Neither should we think of the narrative
identity of a person as requiring one to stand in a relation of sympathy for
one’s past and future condition: it is enough that one does not feel alienated
from them. So the conception of human beings as endowed with the
capacity for attention provides an alternative both to strident individualism
and to impersonal holism. Attention precedes self in the explanation of what
it is to be human, and if there is anything defensible in the concept of self, for
example as the expression of a subjectivity that is at once experiential and
normative, then it itself must be understood in terms of its relationship to
attention. So attention, not self, is what has explanatory priority, and the
misapplication of the concept self is as the concept of a detached author, the
simple origin of willed directives, a concept that forces us to understand the
mind in terms of a dichotomy between free voluntary actions and purely
passive happenings.
 INTRODUCTION
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Such, in outline, is the position I describe and defend here. In doing so
I will draw extensively on the ideas and arguments of a Therava ̄da Buddhist
philosopher, Buddhaghosa, living in Sri Lanka and writing in Pāli around the
ﬁfth century CE. A hugely important ﬁgure in the history of philosophy, his
ideas would inﬂuence conceptions of the human throughout South and
Southeast Asia for a millennium and a half, and they continue to do so today.
Their philosophical signiﬁcance, moreover, is global in reach. For Atten-
tionalism, as we call the stance which lends attention centrality in explana-
tory projects in philosophy, encourages us to rethink many central concepts
in the philosophy of mind from an attention-theoretic perspective. Two
large bodies of data about attention are available to an aspiring Attentionalist:
ﬁrst, the rich experimental studies of contemporary cognitive psychology;
and, second, the information which emerged as a result of meticulous
Buddhist introspective observation of the human mind’s structure and
functioning in the ﬁrst , years after the Buddha lived. I will seek to
draw these two bodies of evidence together, to study the philosophical
implications of their interaction, and thus to form a better appreciation of
the reach and limits of the project. An attention-theoretic approach brings
important new options to the table in contemporary philosophy of mind
and cognitive science, providing new directions to recent work on the
pervasiveness of the mental, embodied cognition, cognitive phenomen-
ology, intersubjectivity, personal identity, and the experience of time.
Michael Dummett recently predicted that ‘the best point of contact
between philosophers of divergent traditions surely lies in the philosophy
of mind’ (: ). Philosophy of mind is indeed a transcultural under-
taking: the search for a fundamental theory of mind must never limit itself to
the intuitions and linguistic practices of any one community of thinkers but
should be ready to learn from diverse cultures of investigation into the
nature of mind and mind’s involvement in world. The Buddhist thinkers
whose ideas are examined here had an enormous interest in getting the story
right about the mind, and for that reason if no other we should take very
seriously what they had to say. One ought not ask ancient texts to bear the
weight of greater expectations than they can sustain, but with discretion and
sensitivity they can be a source of profound philosophical insight.
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